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This research is aimed at assessing whether rules and recommendations adopted in 
European Countries (France; Germany; Italy; Spain; United Kingdom) and non-European 
Countries (Canada; Japan; Russia; United States) enable companies to have a regulatory 
framework as a guarantee of information completeness, so that anyone can, on the one 
hand, assess if the company is transparency-oriented and, on the other, to facilitate the 
comparison of remuneration systems with other companies in other European contexts or 
non-European Countries. Finally, this paper aims to examine how the listed companies, 
operating  in  the  public  utilities  sector,  have  implemented  remuneration  systems  
disclosure  in  the corporate behaviour in order to assess if, European and non-European 
listed companies surveyed behave in conformity with transparency provisions and assure 
stakeholders, information completeness. 
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1. Introduction 
The effectiveness of disclosure of remuneration mechanisms is directly related to substantial, 
comprehensive, fair and exhaustive answers to the cognitive demands arising from different 
social players. 
Information transparency on remuneration systems should facilitate the understanding of: 
− the policies adopted to motivate executive directors, on which basis, a noteworthy part of 
remuneration  might be correlated to the achievement of specific corporate or individual 
objectives, that is the criteria directors’ remuneration systems are based on providing for 
a coherent relation between remuneration and specific objectives/parameters to achieve; 
− the wealth generated by the corporate business and its allocation among who manage the 
company, to the end to check the effective costs and benefits obtained by performance, 
that is, the value of remuneration paid to executive directors and its effects on corporate 
economic results. 
Adequate remuneration paid for the implemented business activity, on the basis of professional 
skills and performance, is the main source of consensus among corporate managers. 
The remuneration system is not the only factor, but it definitely has a decisive impact, both on 
motivation to better performance and on the development of a performance-oriented culture 
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  




based on the ability to attract and retain the best resources. 
Remuneration systems concur in orienting behaviour and meeting the expectations of directors and 
managers and induce, as incentive, effectiveness implementation of governance systems to the end 
of value generation and sustainable development in the long term. 
Meanwhile, the fact that remuneration systems influence corporate behaviour significantly implies 
some risks that could have important consequences on corporate effectiveness: executive  directors, 
in order to reach their goals, could act favouring short term results by maximizing turnover and 
revenues, that is, behave in an opportunistic way in relation to stock option plans by manipulating 
shares’ values. 
In order to limit significantly the risk directors may expose companies to, by manipulating 
information at their own advantage, the existence of a disclosure system of remuneration, able to 
ensure the implementation of fair remuneration practices, is particularly important. 
Top managers should display transparency as far as the disclosure of remuneration by specifying its 
entity and elements, so as to enable shareholders  and other  investors to control the destination of 
the value generated by the company. 
The importance of the topic on remuneration and disclosure tools is also shown by several 
interventions by international organizations such as: OECD, UN, IOSCO etc. and European 
institutions, in particular, the EU intervened with Recommendation 2004/913/EC. 
Therefore, in this paper, the following research questions will be addressed: 
RQ1: What are the main results coming out from the comparison of remuneration systems 
disclosure by rules, regulations and recommendation provided in the Countries considered 
(Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Russia, Spain, United Kingdom, United States) and the 
level of disclosure conformity and alignment to facilitate information accessibility and comparability 
to stakeholders? 
RQ2: How have the listed companies operating in the public utilities sector implemented 
remuneration systems disclosure in the corporate behaviour in order to assess if the companies 
surveyed behave in conformity with transparency provisions and assure information completeness? 
2. Theoretical framework 
The research was based on the analysis of the mandatory and voluntary regulations on disclosure of 
remuneration systems in the in the major industrial Countries – G8 Countries whose 
remuneration and governance systems are presumed among the most developed in the world 
(Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom, United States) and Spain 
(considering its late economic growth) – on the purpose to assess the dominant trend in each of 
these Countries. 
The comparison was developed by setting appropriate framework, which items were defined 
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considering the European Recommendation  2004/913/EC, and then, grouped under the following 
subjects: remuneration policies and executive directors’ remuneration. 
The analysis clearly shows that the United Kingdom is the European Country with the widest 
range of regulations on directors’ remuneration, substantially in line with the provisions of the 
European Recommendation. Even before the European recommendation, since 1995 with the 
Greenbury Code, based on the principle comply or explain, and later, through a specific law in 
2002 “Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations” on the purpose to amend the Companies 
Act 1985, the United Kingdom had a set of rules aimed at promoting the disclosure of remuneration 
systems by listed companies, both as regards the policy of remuneration definition and 
total/individual  remuneration of executive directors, non-executive directors and top managers. 
Undoubtedly, the discrepancies found in the regulatory approaches reflect the different ownership 
structures: the problem of remuneration is, in fact, definitely more relevant within the systems where 
ownership is fragmentized. 
However, the results also highlight that the differences, within the changed international scenario, 
are getting increasingly dwindled. 
In particular, Spain, after the revision of its own Code, published in 2006, seems to have 
accepted a large part of the contents of the European recommendation. It cannot be stated the 
same regarding Germany and Italy. These countries revised their codes, however, without neither 
particular reference to the Commission’s directions nor any motivation about their non- complying 
with the European provisions. With particular reference to Italy, after the Consob’s last provision 
on transparency about stock option plans, it would be opportune a regulatory intervention or a 
set of provisions as regards the disclosure of remuneration policies and a process of simplifying 
and reducing current information fragmentation. 
As regards Germany, a more consistent regulatory framework would be opportune (voluntary or 
mandatory) as far as remuneration policies and annual general meeting resolutions about stock 
option plans. In the end, the degree of transposition of the European recommendation in the 
French system can be considered good. 
As regards the four non-European Countries (Canada, Japan, Russia, United States), the research 
highlights, in the first place, a strong difference in the type of rules adopted concerning the 
disclosure of remuneration systems: on the one hand, a substantial and articulated regulation 
adopted by the Supervisory Exchange Commission of the United States and Canada (SEC and 
Canadian Securities Administrators), with particular attention to equity-based incentive plans; on 
the other, a definitely more limited regulation in force in the other two Countries, Japan and 
Russia. Regulations in the United States and Canada require that listed companies provide the 
market with detailed information on the  remuneration of executive officers and directors, in 
tabular and descriptive form; on the contrary, the provisions in force in Japan and Russia require 
from listed companies summary information and do not  provide for a model of reference on 
disclosure for companies to comply with. 
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In  general, it seems possible to assert the existence of a common approach between the regulatory 
framework in the American Countries and the contents of the European recommendation 
2004/913/EC, but not in the provisions of the remaining Countries, Japan and Russia. 
From the analysis of regulations in the Countries mentioned above the first aggregated groups are 
based on the rules consistency level: 
• United States, Canada and United Kingdom have adopted “strict” rules; 
• Germany, Japan and Russia have provided for “general” instructions; 
• Spain, France and Italy are in an intermediate position. 
In the Anglo-Saxon world (United States, Canada and United Kingdom) the practice of adopting 
transparent remuneration systems undoubtedly derives from the typical features of the outsider 
system, in which there is a net separation between ownership and company control: the former is 
fractioned and widespread, the latter is held by managers. The foundation of public companies in 
United Kingdom and big corporations in the United States has also stressed the necessity of 
protection of  shareholders and stakeholders’ interests related to corporate performance. 
In Germany and Japan, the great importance investing majority shareholders, along with the 
absence of a solid board of directors, has generated scarce attention to performance and effective 
remuneration systems disclosure. This is ultimately proved by the fact that, both in Germany and 
Japan, stock options were considered illegal until the end of the ‘90s. Russia’s situation, 
pursuant to  privatization, is marked by companies that are mostly controlled by an only 
shareholder or a little group of shareholders. 
As far as Latin Countries are concerned, based on insider systems, financial markets are less 
active or developing, ownership is concentrated and stable, and there are impressive equity and 
financial connections between companies and banks. 
The greatest risk in these environments regards minority shareholders: top managers pursue and 
defend, first of all, and, often acting partially, the interests of majority members. Appropriate 
information disclosure can obviously strengthen the protection of minority groups, enhancing 
investor confidence and market forces. France, Spain and Italy belong to this category as well, 
and, as a response to requirements of greater information transparency imposed by 
internationalisation processes, are getting more and more involved in enlarging their provisions 
about disclosure and satisfying, like this, stakeholders’ assessment needs. 
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3. Methodology and Research Design 
This research, carried out on a group of listed companies in European and non-European 
markets, is intended to review at what level companies, operating in the public utilities sector, 
behave in  conformity with transparency rules and assure completeness of information, regardless the 
regulations. 
The decision of focusing on companies operating in the public utilities services is based on the 
importance of disclosure in this sector: the protection of public interests related to the nature of the 
services they offer and the owners’ position, from the one hand; the entrepreneurial independence 
and the ability to create value in the interest of the totality of stakeholders, from the other. On the 
whole, there are 70 listed companies taken under examination in this survey, selected with 
reference to the existence of a segment or Stock Exchange index   dedicated to public utilities or 
to energy, gas  and water sectors in the 9 Countries considered: Canada, France, Germany, 
Japan, Italy, Russia, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. 
 
Tab. 1 – European Companies Surveyed - 2007 
 
Country Company Total 
 
France Areva, Chauf.Urb, Edf, Edf Energies Nouvelles, Gaz de France, GPE Group, Rubis, Sechiellinne Sidec, Suez, Theolia, Veolia Environnement. 
 
11 
Germany EnBW, E.ON, MVV Energie, RWE. 4 
 
Italy 
Acea, Acegas, Acque, ACSM, Actelios, AEM (A2A since 2008), Ascopiave, ASM 
(A2A since 2008), Edison, Enel, Enertad, Eni, Enia, Gas Plus, Gruppo Hera, 









Centrica, Dee Valley, British Energy, Drax, International Power, Novera, 






Tab. 2 – Non-European Companies Surveyed - 2007 
 
Country Company Total 
Canada Cnrl (Canadian Natural Resources Limited), Encana, Nexen, Talisman Energy. 4 
Japan Chubu Electric Power, Okinawa Electric, Osaka, Tokio Gas. 4 









In particular, the analysis has taken under examination 54 European companies representing all the 
listed companies with reference to the Stock Exchange segment of “Public utility” based in the 
European  Countries surveyed: the remaining 16 companies have been selected random among 
the ones belonging to the Stock Exchange segment of “Electricity, gas, waters and multi- utilities” 
in each of the non-European Countries: Canada, Japan, Russia and United States. 
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  




The research method adopted is empirical/inductive and is based on the analysis of mandatory 
documents (balance sheet, consolidated financial statements and notes, annual reports, proxy and 
circular statements, report on operations, corporate governance report, remuneration report, etc.) 
and voluntary documents (social and environmental report, etc.) available on the official 
websites of the  respective companies surveyed, where relevant elements for reviewing the 
effectiveness of  remuneration systems disclosure can be found. This analysis is, therefore, 
carried out with reference to corporate documents, available on their official websites, over the 
period of September – November 2007. 
The comparison has been made by presetting appropriate tables, whose items have been defined 
considering the rules, codes and guidelines issued by each Country on remuneration disclosure, 
and then  grouped on the basis of the following subject: remuneration policy and executive 
directors’ remuneration. 
The aim of this survey is to examine the adjustment level of the companies to specific reference 
rules and offer an overview of the main results coming out from the research, by comparing, at a 
general  level, the different procedures of remuneration systems disclosure adopted by the 54 
European companies versus the ones adopted by the other 16 non-European companies surveyed. 
Besides, the comparison is made on the basis of further aggregation, pursuant to the provisions 
consistency level and the reference context, grouping the companies taken under examination in 
the following categories: “Anglo-Saxon”  companies (Canada,  United Kingdom and  United 
States, equal to 20), “German-Japanese and Russian” companies (Germany, Japan and Russia, 
equal to 12) and “Latin” companies (France, Italy and Spain, equal to 38). 
 
4. Discussion of Findings 
Considering the survey items, some noteworthy elements concerning the following areas are to 
be underlined: 
a) remuneration policy; 
b) executive directors’ remuneration. 
a) Remuneration policy 
From the overall analysis carried out on remuneration policy statements in listed companies, this 
practice  is effective only for a definitely low percentage of companies: in fact, only 28,57% 
(table 3) of the  companies considered disclose their remuneration policies by means of an 
“independent” statement or part of other documents, such as: the corporate governance report, 
the annual report, the annual information circular, etc. 
By distinguishing companies according to their reference context, it clearly comes out that 
companies presetting a remuneration statement, both European or non-European, belong only to 
the Anglo-Saxon world (table 4). 
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Tab.3 – Remuneration statement 
 
European companies non-European 
companies Total 
n % n % n % 
Existence of a 
remuneration statement 
12 22,22 8 50,00 20 28,57 
 









n % n % n % n % 
Existence of a 
remuneration statement 20 100,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 20 28,57 
The information confirm once again that the Anglo-Saxon system is the only one, at present, 
offering the most structured information system. 
In this regard, it is opportune to underline that transparency oriented remuneration systems, 
although affected by the typical features of the outsider system, are based anyway on broad and 
detailed regulations on this subject. This statement is confirmed by the results deriving from the 
analysis concerning the other Countries, where companies, in absence of specific regulations, pay 
no attention to their own remuneration policy disclosure. 
b) Executive directors’ remuneration 
As far as disclosure of the individual executive directors’ remuneration is concerned, the overall 
data show that 60% of the companies surveyed make a similar complete report available. The 
data represent  the general context and differ very little among European and non-European 
companies (table 5). 
Once again, Anglo-Saxon companies are the only ones fully satisfying regulation requirements: in 
fact, all the companies surveyed provide for a remuneration report (table 6). 
Tab.5 – Remuneration Report 
 
European companies non-European 
companies Total 
n % n % n % 
Existence of a 
Remuneration Report 
32 59,26 10 62,50 42 60,00 
 









n % n % n % n % 
Existence of a 
Remuneration Report 20 100,00 6 50,00 16 42,11 42 60,00 
As far as the report contents and the information reported in the analysed documents (table 7) are 
concerned, the overall results coming out from the survey show that most of the companies under 
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  




examination specify individual executive director’s remuneration and its related elements (78,57%). 
Definitely lower is the number of companies providing with a remuneration comparison over 
different fiscal years (44,29%) and even lower is the percentage of companies specifying the 
criteria used to determine the variable part of performance-based remuneration (35,71%) and the 
performance indicators values (12,86%). 
In particular, all the Anglo-Saxon companies surveyed offer highly detailed information regarding 
executive directors’ remuneration, specifying individual remuneration and its elements and 
comparing remuneration paid over different financial years (table 8). 
Tab.7 – Contents of Directors’ remuneration Report 
 
European companies non-European 
companies Total 
n % n % n % 
Individual executive directors’ 
remuneration 
47 87,04 8 50,00 55 78,57 
Elements of executive directors’ 
remuneration (fixed and variable 
components, benefits, …) 
47 87,04 8 50,00 55 78,57 
Comparative table on 
remuneration over consequent 
financial years 
23 42,59 8 50,00 31 44,29 
Adopted criteria in defining 
variable performance-based 
remuneration 
17 31,48 8 50,00 25 35,71 
Specification of performance 
indicators values in order to 
easily understand paid variable 
remuneration 
6 11,11 3 18,75 9 12,86 









n % n % n % n % 
Individual executive 
directors’ remuneration 20 100,00 4 33,33 31 81,58 55 78,57 
Elements of executive 
directors’ remuneration (fixed 
and variable components, 
benefits,…) 
20 100,00 4 33,33 31 81,58 55 78,57 
Elements: Table on 
remuneration over 
consequent financial years. 
20 100,00 4 33,33 7 18,42 31 44,29 
Adopted criteria in defining 
variable performance-based 
remuneration 
19 95,00 2 16,67 4 10,53 25 35,71 
Specification of performance 
indicators values in order to 
easily understand paid variable 
remuneration 
9 45,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 9 12,86 
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Yet, it is to be remarked how, although 95% of Anglo-Saxon companies disclose the criteria 
used to determine variable remuneration, only 45% of these companies specify the performance 
indicators values. Outcome values are only related to the achieved outcome, without providing for 
the forecasted results. 
The percentage of companies belonging respectively to the “German-Japanese and Russian” 
group and to the “Latin” one, offering such information details, is definitely lower and variable 
depending on the elements considered. 
5. Conclusion 
From this analysis it firmly stands out that the level of corporate remuneration systems disclosure, 
strictly connected to the provisions system in force is more satisfying where the rules are structured 
and detailed. In fact, with reference to several elements analysed, where specific legal provisions 
are lacking, information provided by companies is brief or even missing. 
This leads to ponder about the importance of adequate regulations, able to assure an effective 
response to transparency needs and protection to all stakeholders, in light of the present global 
arena, as well. Promoting the culture of transparency is, thus, a “compulsory” step to take in 
order to regain disclosure effectiveness, so that to guide the selection of information concerning 
their own utility, yet in the respect of the principles of completeness and neutrality. 
It is, therefore, desirable the achievement, at an international level, of representation models 
containing uniform and comparable information, both in form (tabular and narrative), and 
contents. Besides, it is evident the need for easily accessible information, avoiding its fragmentation 
in different documents and concentrating it in a specific report, or report section on corporate 
governance. 
Anyway, regardless mandatory provisions, it is to be remarked that accessibility of the necessary 
information about the policy adopted by the company to motivate executive directors and top 
managers is of fundamental importance to stakeholders in order to understand the measure of 
correlation between director remuneration and company goals and results achieved or individual 
objectives. 
In short, stakeholders should own sufficient information to be able to appropriately assess costs and 
benefits and the relation between company performance, on the one hand and the level of 
executive remuneration, on the other. In this respect, disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration 
allows stakeholders to assess the fairness of individual remuneration considering liability and/or 
performance of directors and to facilitate the comparison of remuneration systems with other 
companies. 
In this way, disclosure of executive remuneration can positively influence the achievement of 
stakeholders’ consents concerning the mechanisms through which companies pursue the 
harmonization of different interests, ethical and not opportunistic behavior and the research 
towards development and business continuity. 
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